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DISPLACING HERMENEUTICS 
Nicholas Davey. BA, MA, PhD.   
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, 
University of Dundee, 
jrndavey@dundee.ac.uk 
Displacing Hermeneutics with the 
Hermeneutical?1 
1. Introduction
Given the extensive philosophical problems arrayed against it, should hermeneutics be 
abandoned as an epistemology of interpretation in favour of a reflective pedagogy of practical 
engagement?  Is it not time that hermeneuticians renounce their obsession with legitimising 
the “truth claims” of experience in favour of what we shall call “the hermeneutical,” that is, 
submitting to the (factical) truths of experience that engagement in practice exposes us to? 
Perhaps it is now appropriate to argue for what will seem a heresy amongst many 
philosophical hermeneuticians: the lesson of practical engagement is that the subjectivity of 
experience must be taken really seriously.     
     The following argument is written on the presupposition that the discipline of 
hermeneutics, traditionally understood as an epistemology of interpretation, is bound to fail. 
The nihilistic axiom that there is no truth but only interpretation means that there is no getting 
1 I should like to thank the officers of the North American Society for Philosophical Hermeneutics for inviting 
me to present this paper at their 2018 Annual Conference.  
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to the bottom of epistemological argument. The result is indecisiveness, uncertainty and 
negativity. No wonder that hermeneutics and the humanities appear to be in such a 
methodological crisis. However, if we both switch our framework of argument from the 
epistemological to the ontological, and treat interpretation not as a subject’s interjection but 
as a mode of interactive participatory practice, understanding can be retrieved not as anything 
definitive but as something perfectible. Should philosophical hermeneutics continue to be 
treated as a deviant form of epistemology, then Bildung (the ability of individuals to build on 
and have confidence in their accumulated experience) is stifled by the indecisive. 
Epistemological nihilism corrodes belief in the worthwhileness of practice. Yet regard 
hermeneutic engagement as a participatory practice in a relational ontology, and the 
‘hermeneutical’ becomes an ever fluid movement of insightful formation.  
   
     This paper proposes that (1) philosophical hermeneutics considered as a mode of 
epistemological theory should be abandoned in favour of promoting hermeneutics as a form 
of experiential participation. This explains my title. Hermeneutics considered as a 
warrantable theory of knowing must be displaced by an account of hermeneutics as 
participatory engagement for it is in the ‘eventual’ nature of practice that the ‘hermeneutical’ 
arises. (2) The processes of practical engagement will be presented as engendering the 
occasions in which the ‘hermeneutical’ (an experience of understanding’s movement) arises. 
(3) The arguments concerning practical engagement demand an ontological re-reading of 
subjectivity. No longer should the subject be treated as the epistemological anchor point of 
knowledge but rather as a continuously a plurality of processes which “subjectivise” as one. 
(3) The formation of agency is key to my argument and explains why I oppose Gadamer’s 
claim that subjectivity is impotent. Subjectivity as a mode of the epistemological subject may 
2
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be impotent but considered as the coordinating viewpoint or perspective of a plurality of 
interacting processes, it is far from impotent.      
 
2. Hermeneutical De-fenestration: On Windows and Positions 
     
    To initiate our argument, I borrow two terms from L. Kramer’s text Music as Cultural 
Practice, namely, ‘hermeneutic windows’ and ‘subject-positions.’2 Let us first address the 
notion of a hermeneutic window. Hermeneutic windows frame an event, an occasion. They 
are an opening-out and on-to. They frame a view and render something visible. What makes a 
window ‘hermeneutical’ is the ability to disclose a site of breakdown, to reveal how a change 
of perspective can suddenly expose an object of interpretation as fraught with the tensions of 
unresolved problems. Hermeneutical windows open out on to a Spannungsfeld (Nietzsche).  
They threaten those that look through them with vertigo and, possibly, with conceptual 
defenestration. When texts, paintings or compositions challenge our habitual readings and 
responses, we become disorientated and lose the security of our initial expectancies. 
Kramer’s windows frame the space of hermeneutical experience, opening spaces in my 
understanding between what I thought I had understood and what, I now realise, I plainly had 
not. Passing to Kramer’s second term, the notion of a subject-position, he treats the act of 
interpretation as a sense-making process in which a hermeneutic subject or agency forms its 
perspective or view-point. Our argument is that subject-positions are not applied by knowing 
subjects to the objects of their interpretation (as if an epistemological schema antedated any 
engagement). To the contrary, a subject-position is (in Gadamerian terms) the effect and not 
                                                 
2 Lawrence Kramer, Music as Cultural Practice, 1800-1900, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993.   
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the cause of an interpretive engagement. The subject-position is a consequence of 
engagement in participatory processes. The ontological consequences are discussed below. 
 
     Why am I drawn to my own adaptions of Kramer’s two notions? The reasons are several. 
(1) Hermeneutical windows are subject-positions affording vistas and perspectives which are 
important not so much because of what they look out on to but because of what they reveal of 
the viewing position itself.  It is not that a Cartesian subject is looking out onto a 
hermeneutical terrain but rather that the window itself frames or articulates the complexity 
which is the viewer’s mode of seeing, a mode of seeing which differentiates it from the 
perspectives of other interacting agencies. (2) Kramer’s metaphors suggest that it is 
impossible to think of hermeneutic engagement or interaction without an appeal to a 
perspective-setting force or agency. This returns the notion of the subject and subjectivity to 
the centre of hermeneutic debate. Both the Heideggerian and Gadamerian critiques of the 
subject and subjectivity are well known. However, the abandonment of epistemological 
approaches to interpretation in favour of an ontological model of hermeneutic interaction 
makes it necessary to re-think the subject and subjectivity. (3) Without the notion of engaged 
subjectivities (here I  invoke Nietzsche’s ‘subject as a multiplicity’), education understood as 
transformative practice makes no sense. If education (whatever the discipline) is about 
anything at all, it is surely about the empowerment of a subject-position to engage with 
confidence in the social and cultural terrains it finds itself within. Dialogue, participation and 
transformative practice whether in art, religion or medicine are inconceivable without 
subject-agencies or -positions. The notion of ex-change would be redundant. Hermeneutical 
education is, arguably, about practical empowerment. This is a point worth stressing.  As 
public education moves towards quantitative models of assessment (or normative modes of 
social compliance) the more it moves away from those formative individual practices of 
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engagement and judgement which give such compelling force to Gadamer’s notion of 
Bildung. In arguing this we are not advocating a reactionary return to bourgeois notions of 
the knowing subject as the ground of all discernment, judgement, and taste. Articulating 
inter-action not reaction is our concern. (4) Bildung, considered as an ontological process, 
promises a way of circumventing the negativity of post-structural and deconstructive 
critiques of the knowing subject, critiques which render any notion of hermeneutic 
transformation and education facile. However, if knowing is presented not as the activity of 
an isolated epistemological subject but as the effect of inter-acting subjectivities, a tractable 
notion of Bildung as practical engagement and transformation can be formulated. This move 
is dependent upon recognising the antecedence of the ‘hermeneutical.’ The formative 
narratives indicative of an unfolding Bildung are dependent upon the ontological priority of 
hermeneutical defenestration;that is, upon a subject-agency or subject-centre undergoing the 
experience of its leading assumptions being challenged by exposure to altogether different 
and unexpected ways of thinking. This predicament we call ‘the hermeneutical.’ Our central 
proposal is that the primacy of hermeneutics as a philosophy of interpretation should be 
displaced by the “hermeneutical” considered as a consequence of ontological inter-action. If 
hermeneutical reflection is to be retrieved from the strictures of post-modern critique the 
proposal has some merit.  
 
   Access to our primary argument is anticipated by a remark Gadamer makes on a distinction 
of Julius Stenzel.         
 If emphasis has been -rightly- placed on the fact that meaning is related to the “I”, 
this means, as far as hermeneutical experience is concerned, that all meaning that is 
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handed down to us finds its concretion in its relation to the “understanding I”  and not 
in reconstructing the originally intending “I”.3 
Stenzel’s differentiation suggests displacing the epistemological (intending) subject with the 
“understanding I.” The latter we shall articulate as a subject-agency both engaged by and in 
participatory processes of transaction. As we shall see to our advantage, there is a 
provocative connection between the “understanding I” and Heidegger’s notion of Dasein. 
However, let us further contextualise the lead argument. 
 
3. Subjectivity dismissed.  
  
If we are defending the view that ‘hermeneutical’ engagement makes no sense without an 
appeal to engaged subjectivities, why does Gadamer adopt such a negative attitude towards 
“subjectivity”?   He speaks specifically of “the impotence of subjective particularity”.4  In                                                
such passages, Gadamer openly attacks the psychologistic and subjectivist supposition that 
meaning resides in what a subject ‘intends’ or in what volitional consciousness imposes on its 
world. He is clear that subjectivist accounts of meaning are not as they proclaim: spontaneous 
acts on the part of a knowing subject which bring ex nihilo meaning and colour into a 
meaningless world. Such “subjects” are not the masters of the meanings they claim to 
command. 
 
                                                 
3 Julius Stenzel, Über Sinn, Bedeutung, Begriff, Definition, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 
1958. 
4 Hans-Georg Gadamer,Truth and Method, London, Sheed and Ward, 1989, p. 489.  
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  The anchor point of Gadamer’s critique of “romantic” accounts of meaning lies his reading 
of Hegel. “All self-knowledge arises from what is historically pre-given, what with Hegel we 
call substance because it underlies all subjective intentions and actions… What we need to 
discover in all that is subjective, is the substantiality that determines it.” 5 This gives a 
particular nuance to Gadamer’s phrase “subjective reflection.” The emphasis is not in fact on 
the act of a subject thinking but on what comes to be reflected in and through that thinking. 
According to this view, meaning resides in the substantive structures of tradition and 
language? that shape the subject’s outlook. Epistemological subjectivity is secondary, 
dependent upon the wider substantive structures that shape it.  Gadamer describes “self-
knowledge” accordingly as getting to know not one’s subjectivity per se but all that underlies 
it.6    
 
4. Subjectivity re-considered 
 
     In the preceding remarks Gadamer’s hostility to subjectivist accounts of meaning is clear. 
Yet, as other passages in Truth and Method make evident, subjective experience is also 
presented in way that is anything but impotent. Other passages present subjectivity as the site 
of an inner-historicality of experience.  Gadamer’s account of Aeschylus’s pathei mathos 
(learning through suffering) implies the emergence of a subjectivity that becomes aware of 
itself in confrontation with its limitations, inadequacies and mistakes.7 On this account 
‘profound’ experience is far from inconsequential but involves the experience of one’s own 
                                                 
5 ibid p. 302 
6 ibid p. 302.  
7 Hans-Gadamer, Truth and Method, London, Sheed and Ward, 1989, p. 356. 
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finitude. Gadamer’s account of pathei mathos is a hermeneutical window. Such windows 
reveal ‘hermeneutical’ experience as a contested space where conflicting interpretations in 
which we are complicit collide.  Plainly, such experience can only be undergone by an 
engaged and embodied subjectivity. On this stands one of philosophical hermeneutics’ key 
claims: subjective awareness only arises because of deep prior practical involvements 
(Dasein). Such reflective awareness is, indeed, a consequence, if not an expression, of its 
preceding practical embeddedness.  
 
The conundrum is plain. On the one hand we have an argument that with regard to the 
question of meaning, Gadamer derides the impotency of subjectivity and yet, on the other, 
there is the appeal to intense subjectivisation (the pathei mathos argument), an experience 
Gadamer takes so seriously as to liken it to religious experience.8 Can these cross-currents of 
argument be reconciled? First, some initial qualifications. Gadamer is certainly right to insist 
that subjective consciousness can never be its own master. It is the product of an epistemé 
which marks and shapes its orientations. That substantiality can, of course, be analysed, 
permitting a given subjectivity to become more hermeneutically aware of its nature. To a 
degree, Gadamer’s hermeneutics follows a “hermeneutics of suspicion” which for very 
different reasons also deconstructs the Cartesian epistemological ‘I’.  The consequence of this 
is somewhat nihilistic. Theoretical analysis is, as Nietzsche appreciated, disempowering, 
interminable and alienating.  It questions the veracity of a subject’s motives, it leads to 
endless and irresolvable analytic disputes which, in turn, have the effect of alienating 
subjective consciousness from its practical world. Such confusion has blatantly contributed to 
                                                 
8 ibid. p. 357.  
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the current critical demise of both hermeneutics and the humanities. Indeed, the argument of 
this paper is a contribution towards freeing the hermeneutical from this demise.  
 
5.  The Framing of Argument 
 
Before we address the current confusions afflicting hermeneutics, let us step back 
momentarily from the main argument to consider its principal points so far. (1) We have 
established the juxtaposition between Gadamer’s critique of the impotence of subjective 
consciousness on the one hand and his crucial positioning of intense personal experience at 
the heart of hermeneutic engagement on the other. (2) The pathei mathos argument neatly 
maps on to Kramer’s distinction between hermeneutical windows framing colliding 
interpretations and his invocation of a struggle towards a sense-making ‘subject position.’  
(3) Whereas Kramer and Gadamer strongly differentiate between the two elements of this 
distinction, I would argue that the two elements are mutually dependent. There can be no 
vision of endlessly competing interpretive stances other than in relation to the initial interests 
of distinct subject-positions. It is only because ‘I’ as a practitioner have strongly held views 
of a subject-matter that its dissolution into a myriad of competing perspectives can pain me. 
Practical engagement is already presupposed. This favours a stronger claim: what comes to 
frame in a consciousness of competing interpretations is not the site of an contested 
battlefield of opposing perspectives but a coming to consciousness of consciousness itself as 
such a contested site, a consciousness with different ‘voices’, inclinations and intuitions 
vying each with the other to work out a coherent “subject-position” This stronger claim 
establishes the grounds for two further ones. 
(1) The interdependent elements of windows and subject-positions structure what can be 
described as the hermeneutic predicament itself.  The hermeneutic predicament 
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involves not just the assertion of our facticity but the experiencing of it. This can be 
characterised as the constant interplay between an environment of competing 
perspectives each of which has a bearing on a subject-agency and the way that agency 
has to establish its subject-position (perspective, voice or outlook).  
(2) All practices embody in their being, hermeneutical predicaments. Practices embrace 
(to adapt MacIntryre’s phrase) ‘continuities of conflict’ over ends, purposes and 
subject-matters implying that a practitioner is constantly challenged by and reviews 
her ‘subject-position(s).’ 
 
These two claims underpin my principal argument that ‘the hermeneutical’ should displace 
hermeneutics as a theoretical edifice. Let us now elaborate the equation of practice with the 
‘hermeneutical’. Heidegger’s notion of Dasein and his articulation of the nature of artwork 
offer useful guidance.   
 
6. Practice, Dasein and the Hermeneutical  
 
   Our being-in-the-world (Dasein) is always a being-situated in a historical, cultural world.  
This is another way of saying that Dasein is practical (i.e. we are defined, attuned and 
constrained by practices and implicitly know how to ‘get on’ with the tasks they impose). If 
Dasein is a practical space or a place-holder term for where the multiple processes which 
constitute our social and cultural being intersect, Dasein denotes a porous space in and 
thorough which different practices are interwoven. The processes of practice, the practitioner 
and the practised-upon, co-inhere and are codependent. The space of practice is stressed in 
the engineering sense, a location which articulates an intensity of multiple languages, 
10
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aspirations and modes of behaviour. Practices involve liminal spaces which forever point 
beyond themselves to other articulations of their norms, rationales or conventions. In 
Kramer’s metaphor, practical spaces are windows which reveal multiple, 
shiftingcommitments and expectations. They bring our hermeneutical being into a conscious 
framework.  
 
The movements of practical spaces have deep implications for how the practitioner 
understands herself as a practitioner. The co-inherence of practice and practitioner means that 
the practitioner’s notions of what it means to be a virtuous practitioner are live questions. The 
space of practice is always a space of questioning and of being-in-question. Changes in the 
surrounding social and economic circumstances of practice impact upon how a practitioner 
comes to understand herself as a practitioner. The space of practice is, then, always a space of 
questions and of being-in-question. In this context, Kramer’s second notion of finding a 
subject-position is crucial. 
 
By subject-position, I mean a position of confident coherent action within constantly shifting 
ontological circumstances. When Gadamer speaks of the necessity of finding free spaces in 
higher education, the implication involves more than escaping bureaucratic restraints.9 In any 
practice there is always an initial level of determination and subservience to its traditional 
norms and expectancies. The more practiced a practitioner, however, the more initiated she 
becomes in navigating the continuities of conflict that constitute her practice. Such conflicts, 
liminal spaces and incommensurabilities form the ‘free spaces’ (Gadamer) opened up (made 
possible) by a practice. These spaces open the ‘hermeneutical windows’ by means of which 
                                                 
9 Hans-Georg Gadamer,, On  Education, Poetry, and History, Applied Hermeneutics, ed. Misled and Nicholson, 
Albany, State University of New York Press, 1992. p.59  
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possibilities for intervening in a practice arise, interventions upon which the renewal and 
furtherance of that practice depend. Such interventions are ontologically crucial. 
 
The ontological processes which form each practice are furthered by cycles of non-identical 
repetition which allow a practice to become, in Gadamer’s phrase, cumulatively “more” by 
means of repetitions of the same but in endlessly different ways. The cumulative differences 
arising from such repetitions are crucial: they are onto-generative, giving to shape to 
emergent identities, continuities and narrative forms which chart the duration of a practical 
life. The process is one of Bildung, one of formation through practical engagement. In this 
context,  Bildung does not concern the moulding of an individual according to prevalent 
cultural norms but involves immersion in processes of continual transformation. It is a 
process in which individual (practitioner) and collective (traditions of practice) are mutually 
dependent and mutable. Kramer’s hermeneutical windows do not look out on a fixed 
landscape. They are reflective spaces. They afford remembered passages of experience which 
taken collectively give rise to a sense of a journey unfolding. Each view is non-identical but 
collectively they come to form an emerging sense of the terrain from which a practice has 
emerged and towards which it is seemingly moving. What is essentially involved is an inter-
relatedness of movement and the emergence of narrative structures it gives rise to. The 
aesthetic space - which for Heidegger is our experience of the artwork - discloses to the 
spectator the world he or she lives in. It reveals or, rather, it subjects the spectator to a way of 
seeing, making visible things that are hidden in the visual.  
 
   Movement between hermeneutical horizons implies instability: the place of hermeneutic 
practice is accordingly place of risk. As Iser has shown, the ontological location of a 
practitioner in a practical domain places them in a liminal space which puts the practitioner’s 
12
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“self-understanding” in question.10 This suggests a clear interactive relation between the 
ontology of a practice - its contested nature - and the self-understanding of a practitioner 
which, because grounded in that practice, is equally riven and contested. Contemporary 
medical practice is cross-hatched by religious and political discourse focussing on the body 
and is, furthermore, subject to the continuous influence of Greek ethics and competing 
historical notions of health, healing and sickness. To practice as a present-day medic is to be 
continually “cross-pressured” (Taylor) by variant cultural processes.11 It is also to be cross-
pressured by many other contemporary political and economic demands.  
 
    Gadamer’s linkage of understanding with its enabling linguistic and historical horizons of 
concern (subject-matters) is a decisive move in the overthrow of the remnants of Kant’s 
subject-based epistemological heritage. Yet, if Gadamer’s argument has a short-coming, it is 
that it underestimates the complexity of horizons threaded through our existence (Dasein).  
Hermeneutical existence has a denser multi-dimensionality than Gadamer seemingly allows. 
We are perhaps misled by such singular generalisations as the Sprachswelt. Our horizons are 
multiple: existence as social beings is threaded through with numerous ‘practical’ concerns: 
our sense of being a member of a community, of being a father and of being a friend. The 
demands and responsibilities attached to such concerns are not necessarily consistent. 
Tensions exist both within and between their horizons. Nor do these practices exist in 
isolation. They are linked by a common grounding in the Sprachswelt, the ontological base of 
all practices. Practices are also all subject to the common and communising stresses and 
strains of facticity. Crucially, these practices involve projections (in the Heideggerian sense 
                                                 
10 Wolfgang Iser, The Range of Interpretation, New York, Columbia University Press, 2000, p.145 -157. 
11 See Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2007. 
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of the term), each anticipating future and by no means consistent outcomes. Yet, clearly, 
different practical horizons both inform and inflect each other. 
 
   Being a ceramic artist raises the question of what it means to be a good potter. The practice 
projects a credible answer. Because of the inter-connectedness of our cultural environments, 
an exemplar of good ceramic practice (confidence with materials, resolute execution, 
attaining a clarity of form etc.) can open an insight into a musician’s concern with the nature 
good performance practice. As historical, social and linguistic creatures we are constantly 
cross-pressured by unresolved questions as to what is meaningful in practices, by questions 
of how the ‘virtues’ of good practice might resolve tensions and traumas across the complex 
range of our commitments.  
 
    Practice-discourses are frequently inter-linked by place-holder terms such that an answer to 
what constitutes a brave performance in music can have a bearing upon what is understood as 
courageous performance in poetry or novel writing.  Answers to these questions often lie 
unresolved in memory but on occasion exposure to a courageous performance in music can 
bring to mind an answer to a forgotten question about what it means to face up to the 
demands of one’s materials as a painter. Consideration of these practical virtues also have a 
bearing upon what it means to be a brave, courageous, and open-minded person. There are no 
definitive answers to these questions. Shared placeholder terms allow questions and 
responses in one practice to inflect their counter-parts in another discourse. This returns us to 
the metaphor of Kramer’s windows. 
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   The image of looking out on to a plethora of competing interpretations, some 
incommensurable, others inadequate or unresolved, reveals the alleged weakness in 
hermeneutics that deconstruction easily exposes. Nihilism is often presented as the inevitable 
result of an irresolvable ‘conflict of interpretations.’ However, epistemological 
inconclusiveness and undecidability do not constitute objections to the ‘hermeneutical’ but 
embody its presence. Such objections only apply if it is assumed that hermeneutics makes 
verifiable epistemological claims. The burden of our argument is, however, to the contrary: 
the ‘hermeneutical’ is not primarily a theory of knowing but concerns an ontological 
predicament epitomised in the tensions of practice. Apart from failing to realise that 
inconclusiveness and undecidability constitute the hermeneutic predicament, the problem 
with deconstruction is that it approaches hermeneutical objects as epistemological objects 
whose ‘truth’ is to be verified by a knowing subject distanced from the objects that resist its 
immediate assimilative categories. There is a mistake in this thinking which Heideggerian 
philosophy should have resolved long ago: hermeneutics is neither theory, nor epistemology, 
but ontology. What is needed is an ontological account of hermeneutical experience, not an 
epistemological account. Let us go back to our earlier invocation Dasein.  
 
   Dasein is not an attribute of a subject’s existence, as if the two were separable. Dasein is a 
subject’s being - it is that living nexus of concerns and interests that configure the 
“subjectivity” (the practical orientation) of that being. Returning to Kramer’s window, we 
should no longer think of an epistemological subject looking out upon a plethora of 
competing perspectives but, rather, think of that constellation as the subject-configuration 
itself. The ever-shifting field of competing interpretations is Dasein, that is, is a subject-
agency’s mode of being. Such a notion of the hermeneutic subject whose interaction and 
struggle is the basis of our thought in general is no stranger to Nietzsche. 
15
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The assumption of one single-subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it is just as 
permissible to assume a multiplicity (the subject position is a multiplicity) whose 
interaction and struggle is the basis of our thought in general…  My hypothesis: the 
subject as multiplicity: the continual transitoriness and fleetingness of the subject. 
12(WP 490) 
This ontological conception of hermeneutical being or Dasein is pluralistic. We are in our 
engaged ‘doing’ in? the site of plural practices, historical, linguistic and cultural. What, 
however, does it mean to refer to such a plurality of practices as a site? This returns us to the 
notion of a subject-position. How does a multiplicity become “a subject” and how does it 
gain it cohesiveness and coherence? Gadamer has already offered an answer to this in his 
comment on Stenzel. 
 
    As far as ‘hermeneutical experience’ is concerned, Gadamer contends that the meaning of 
what is handed down to us finds its concretion in the ‘understanding I’ and not in 
reconstructing the originally ‘intending I’. The distinction is suggestive. We are not talking 
about an “I”  (a subject) that has ‘understanding’ as one of its modes but, rather, of a mode of 
understanding (Dasein) that configures itself, has become effective as an “I” or subject-
position as one of its modes. The processes of experience subjectivise, that is, practising 
articulates the practitioner.  
 
    When an understanding makes itself manifest it is never, ontologically speaking, ex nihilo 
but always situated in an established play of horizons and concerns. Emergent understanding 
reconfigures what is already in play in a practice. To repeat, the “understanding I” is not an 
“I” that has the attribute of understanding. Rather, it is that mode of understanding 
                                                 
12 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, London, 1968, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968, Sec. 490 
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(interaction) which as a multiplicity itself operationalises the fiction of being an I. The 
‘understanding I” is an operational concept (Eugen Fink) developed from within complex 
process of inter-related modes of understanding which allow it to think of and coordinate 
itself as “one”.13 The defence of such a claim is transcendental: coordinated singularity can 
only be (formally) thought if an appeal to such a formal figure of reflection is made.  Without 
the operational notion of an “understanding I” it becomes difficult if not impossible to think 
of how a multiplicity could coordinate itself as a singularity, establish a cohesive narrative 
and actively manage its collective interests. This, of course, only renders such a multiplicity 
thinkable as an effective singularity. It does not imply that it is ontologically singular in any 
essentialist sense of the term. What these various points suggest is that the sphere of 
understanding - the totality of interactions within a Dasein - is synonymous with the sphere 
of that subject’s (i.e. manifold’s) range of being.  
 
   However, this is emphatically not to say that the sphere of understanding is reducible to 
what is within a subject-manifold’s immediate grasp. Gadamer will insist on the axiom: 
Bewusstsein (consciousness) is always more Being than knowing.  A subject-agency (Dasein) 
is defined by its concerns: it lives in a field of interests, it has worries, is made uneasy and 
feels both anxious and vulnerable. In this context, it is perfectly plausible to say that ‘my 
practice concerns itself with’ or ‘has the following concerns’. This is, in fact, another way of 
saying that a practice has its vulnerabilities and that its interests can be challenged. The being 
of a subject-agency is defined by its fluid condition of being forever cross-pressured by the 
flow and counter-flow of interrelating concerns and dependencies. The subject-position is 
thus always in question, for the being of understanding is always in unstable movement. In 
                                                 
13 I am grateful to Prof. John Caputo for pointing out the link with Eugen Fink. 
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other words, the subject-position (the “understanding I”) maintains itself as a continuity of 
operation.  This operation is the subject’s being, an endless wrestling of its manifold into a 
body of coherent interactions able to react to and respond to others that pressure and attack it 
as one.14  Ontologically speaking, the forever contested site of understanding is, then, the 
locus of the subject-position. Gadamer’s aesthetics is helpful here. The artwork is not an 
independent essence or entity to which its historical effects are predicated, rather the 
artwork’s effectivity is its being. So it is also, we contend, with the subject-position.  
 
   Gadamer’s “understanding I” is not an “I” that understands but rather an understanding that 
has an effectivity as a subject-posture able to interact and engage with other such alignments. 
That understanding (my existence) does not exist apart from its effects: its being is the past 
and future history of those effects and the potentialities they hold. Many of them are 
unpredictable such that practical engagement can be described as a consequentialism of 
unintended effects. This underpins our argument that in higher education negotiating the 
hermeneutical (the experience of one’s understanding being decisively shifted) should be 
prioritised over the teaching of hermeneutics as a mode of philosophical theory. Engagement 
in the hermeneutical is to be practically located, which is to say, situated, in the cross-
pressuring demands of language, history and cultural orientation. The challenge for higher 
education is how to empower engagement in such existentially ‘testing’ situations. Here 
much depends upon on the connotations of the phrase ‘testing situation’ and whether it is 
read negatively or positively. This is not an either-or juxtaposition but more a question of 
dialectical entailment, of a positivity of thought being contained within a dominant 
negativity. Kramer’s hermeneutical windows test a subject-position in that they indicate the 
                                                 
14 See article the very useful article by Pietro Terzi, “The Relevance of Fink’s Notion of Operative Concepts for 
Derrida’s Deconstruction”, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol 50, 2019, Issue No. 1. 
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shattering of cherished interpretational expectancies. Yet, this very challenge puts the 
subject-position to the test creatively. Established interpretations do not simply fail. They are 
displaced or set aside as outmoded because shifts in historical and cultural circumstances 
reveal other logical or practical alternatives. Extensions of hermeneutical understanding are 
dependent upon the via negativa of circumstantial challenge and critique. In Howard 
Caygill’s phrase, practice is a device for provoking accidents, a trip or a trap (…) it negates 
what is already given…”15 This emphasises the ontological priority of practical engagement 
for it is in an through the hermeneutical movements of practise that the “understanding I” can 
‘become more’.  
 
7. Reversing the Emphasis 
 
  In arguing for the primacy of hermeneutical experience, we are not advocating a return to an 
anti-intellectualist position which would displace theory with practice. Far from it, our 
argument offers a careful moderation on Gadamer’s notion of “philosophical hermeneutics,” 
specifically its internal implications. The phrase does not imply that in being philosophical, 
hermeneutics is or should be considered a theory or a philosophy of interpretation. If it is 
treated as a philosophy or as a methodological means to determining the truth of a text, it will 
fail and collapse into nihilism. The finitude of understanding, the perspectival nature of 
cognition, and the generation of unclose-able differential and liminal spaces by the 
application of interpretative method, all imply that hermeneutics will fail. Adequacy between 
hermeneutic object and hermeneutic method is impossible to achieve. However, nihilism is 
not the inevitable result of this seeming impasse. A switch to an ontological account of 
                                                 
15Howard Caygill, Kafka, In the Light of the Accident, London, Bloomsbury, 2016. p. 192  
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practice moves us away from thinking about hermeneutics as a theory of interpretation 
towards considering the ‘hermeneutical’ as the expression of a practical situation. This turn 
does not entail the negation of philosophical theory within hermeneutical practices. Two 
points support this. (1) Hermeneutical meaning is always embodied. Embodied meaning is 
marked by its temporal and spatial signature in historical culture. The anti-intellectualist 
claim that theory can be separated from practice is absurd. If all practices are culturally 
shaped, they cannot be separated from their ideational elements. (2) Gadamer makes it clear 
that the philosophical component of hermeneutical experience involves reflecting on what is 
at play within practice and hermeneutic experience. The phrase ‘philosophical hermeneutics’ 
certainly implies reflection on the formal conditions governing the possibilities of 
understanding but it also entails a reflection on what is at play within hermeneutic experience 
such that philosophical hermeneutics entails a reflecting philosophically upon the conflicts 
and challenges within ‘hermeneutic’ experience. Gadamer always insists that gaining a 
reflective distance from the immediate claims of experience is not to prioritise the status of 
theory but to use theoretical reflection to navigate experience in a more insightful manner. 
Theory becomes a means to deeper involvement in practical engagement. There is a clear and 
substantial corollary to this. 
 
   If philosophical hermeneutics prioritises not the teaching of hermeneutic theory per se but 
the advancement of hermeneutical reflection on the antecedent conflicts that inevitably 
emerge from within practical engagement, hermeneutical reflection is relevant to any practice 
where the meaning of its goals and aims are contested. Hermeneutic philosophy should no 
longer be cloistered within specialist philosophy programmes. In itself, it is not, cannot be 
taught as, and is not defensible as pure theory. Gadamer in fact argues that “theoretical 
knowledge is originally not opposed to practical activity but its highest intensification and 
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perfection.”16 Hermeneutics is not metaphysics. To the contrary, hermeneutical reflection 
becomes more a means of acute listening to what is at play within a practice and to the 
murmurings of what as yet unrealised possibilities it might hold. Contested meanings, ends 
and goals are always historically located and therefore subject to many levels and types of 
interpretation. Of course, given the facticity of existence, no end-interpretation is attainable. 
Yet, by forcing the emergence of a subject-position, what such negativity renders attainable is 
a deeper, better engagement with and grasp of what it at play within contested practices. 
Hermeneutical reflection does not have theoretical knowledge as it aim but a greater clarity 
regarding the aims and likely consequences of one’s practical involvements. No practice is 
problem-free or can avoid controversy.  Hermeneutical reflection is not a philosophical add-
on to a practice but an essential element of its articulation. Like many of the religious 
doctrines it once served, hermeneutics has become fully secularised. In so doing, it is has 
become relevant to how any form of practical engagement can reflect on the constant 
challenge of change and disruption. The educational relevance of hermeneutic reflection is 
perfectly clear. It is engagement in the challenges of practice that establish points of entry 
into the teaching of hermeneutic theory. Theory as such should not be taught as the basis of 
practical engagement but only as a way of elucidating what such engagement entails. 
Returning briefly to an insight of Heidegger is instructive.  
 
By prioritising ontological engagement (practice) over (theory), we, in effect, follow 
Heidegger’s prior ordering of Dasein (practice) over interpretation (elucidatory attempts to 
draw out what is entailed in Dasein).17  Heidegger specifically equates Dasein with the 
                                                 
16 Hans-Georg Gadamer, On Education , Poetry, and History, Applied Hermeneutics, Albany, State University 
of New York Press, 1992, p. 19 
17 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1962, p. 82ff. 
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ontological priority of understanding (Verstehen) which Gadamer, in turn, supplants with his 
derivative notion of Sprachlichkeit. Interpretation for Heidegger is secondary: it that entails 
that reflective effort to draw out our grasp of a practice especially when in Wittgenstein’s 
terms, we no longer “know how to go on.”  An analogy with Kramer’s window is pertinent. 
What in the Heideggerian model stimulates ‘interpretation’ is a breakdown within 
understanding grasped as Dasein. This we have presented as a network set of practical 
orientations, a Spannungswelt, the movements of which both ground and express themselves 
in one’s being-in-the-world, a process of being revealed in and through the movement of 
one’s practices. We may also equate the facticity of existence with understanding: the 
facticity of one’s being in continuous question about the direction and limits of one’s 
practical being. Here we come to a major juncture in our argument, a poignant consequence 
of the philosophical figuring of interpretation as the elaboration of what is within 
understanding. Understanding in Heidegger’s sense is synonymous with Dasein and Dasein 
concerns our involvement in a range of practices the movement of which constitutes our 
being-in-the world. This suggest that, in the first instance, the role of the hermeneutical 
pedagogy should lead the practitioner into deep immersion in the operational practices that 
constitute her being. Such immersion is dialectical. On the negative side, no interpretation of 
a practice will be final or exhaustive but, on the positive side, it enhances one’s stock of 
possible reference points when it comes to achieving future new alignments of meaning. Here 
pedagogy should linger and dwell with those moments of hermeneutic opening when a 
practice starts to break down or when, to use John Millbank’s phrase “the word becomes 
strange.” [citation needed] Such moments of crisis and challenge are of supreme 
‘hermeneutic’ value in that they begin to reveal what is operative beneath the assumptions 
and expectations of a practice. It is here that ‘hermeneutic listening’ is of paramount 
importance. The teacher should not lead the student into hermeneutic theory per se, as if 
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moments of crisis were problems requiring conceptual solution. To the contrary, teacher and 
student should travel further into such moments of defenestration trying to sense where the 
broken shards of a practice intimate a pathway of thought which might lead beyond a given 
impasse. Of course, the rich endowment of hermeneutical philosophy can and should be used 
in evolving of such pathways but (and this is the key point), it is the demands of practice that 
call hermeneutical theory into play and not the reverse. This emphasises Heidegger’s claim 
that interpretation (the utilisation of theory) is only a means to draw out what is already 
actually or potentially at play within understanding (Dasein). This re-states and our primary 
argument. 
 
   ‘Hermeneutic experience’ grasped as the breaking of projected expectancies and the 
challenges of facticity is necessarily and unavoidably indicative of our practical being. 
However, the disappearance of truth and scepticism with regard to meaningful existence are 
only negatives in an epistemological perspective. Within practice ontologically conceived, 
negativity conveys a positivity: the possibility of coming to think differently about a practice 
and its subject-matters. This is why the practise of learning to dwell within moments of 
hermeneutical crisis is important. The skill is ontogenetic: it gives rise to something beyond 
itself. In learning to respond to negative challenges, the practitioner develops a repertoire of 
responses which builds the narrative of both the practitioner and her practice. The growth of 
such responses builds practical confidence: we “learn how to go on” and to diminishes 
anxiety about the facticity of existence. Nothing could be more instructive in times of crisis. 
For the reflective practitioner, negativity invites enhanced involvement in their practice, an 
invitation to become more.  This implies that ‘hermeneutical’ engagement (practical 
involvement) should gain precedence over, displace the priority of, but not negate 
hermeneutic theory.  It is a question of emphasis and of proper ontological ordering. 
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8. Conclusion; Practice and Navigating the Negative    
 
If hermeneutics is treated as a body of philosophical theory which establishes models of how 
texts, art-works and historical artefacts are to be interpreted, it will fail. Considered as an 
epistemology of interpretation, hermeneutical theory dies by its own hand. The more 
interpretation pursues the “truth” of its object, the more it will fail. As Wolfgang Iser has so 
effectively shown, interpretation, rather than seizing its object convincingly, only succeeds in 
differing it, opening further liminal (but luminous) differential spaces.18 However, this is a 
negative result only if we persist in treating hermeneutics as an epistemological procedure 
rather than as offering an ontological account of practice. Practice considered as ontological 
engagement does not entail closure but the opening of liminal spaces capable of extending 
options for the agency of a subject-position. This switch to an ontological account of 
interpretive practice moves us away from considering “hermeneutics” as a theory towards 
considering it as a way of reflecting on the entailments of participatory engagement in 
practice. In essence, the switch would entail displacing ‘hermeneutics’ with the 
“hermeneutical.’  By the ‘hermeneutical,’ we mean precisely those intense moments reflexive 
awareness whereby we are brought to see our practice and our role within it profoundly 
differently. Such experience is deeply affecting if not disorientating. And yet, these moments 
of negativity have dialectical twist to them: they always reveal other interpretive possibilities 
to how we now think of ourselves as competent agencies. This is why practice and its 
associated subjectivities are more fundamental to education than theory.  
 
                                                 
18 Wolfgang Iser, The Range of Interpretation, New York, Columbia University Press, 2000, p.146-152 
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No practice whether literary or mathematical can ever be reduced to theory alone. It is 
therefore quite impossible to anticipate all the possibilities latent with a practice capable of 
extending our understanding of both it and the consequences of our involvement in it. 
Practice always involves a consequentialism of unintended effects. Only our involvement in a 
practice will draw out its unseen possibilities. As Caygill has suggested, practices are devices 
for creating revealing and insightful accidents. Such accidents may be indicative of moments 
of crisis but they also mark the point where negativity and suffering become constructive. 
Each subject-position is a position un-resolved, always shifting and moving: the hermeneutic 
turmoil of a subject-position (practitioner) is its being.  This establishes our principal point. 
Ontologically speaking, the ‘hermeneutical’ (practical engagement) has priority over 
hermeneutics (theory). The precondition of learning is hermeneutic defenestration and 
defenestration the condition of a new subject-position emerging. The formation of a new 
alignment of meaning is the achievement of a new subject-position. That achievement is 
made possible only by an ontically prior immersion in practice and, as such, is a new event in 
the Sprachswelt (i.e. the world of understanding in Heidegger’s sense). The emergence of a 
new-subject position marks both the occasion of an ‘understanding “I”’ achieving a further 
moderation of its being and an addition to the stock of meaning-alignments (other possible 
subject-positions) within the Sprachswelt. That addition enriches the hermeneutical-
existential options for other subject-agencies and with that enrichment the being of the 
Sprachswelt (the totality of practices) is increased.  
 
Nicholas Davey 
01.04.2019. 
 
Short Abstract  
25
DISPLACING HERMENEUTICS   
Is it not time that hermeneuticians renounce their obsession with legitimising the “truth 
claims” of experience in favour of what we shall call “the hermeneutical,” that is, submitting 
to the (factical) truths of experience that engagement in practice exposes us to? Perhaps, it is 
now appropriate to argue for what will seem a heresy amongst many philosophical 
hermeneuticians; the lesson of practical engagement is that the subjectivity of experience 
must be taken really seriously. If it is not, neither hermeneutic exchange nor hermeneutical 
education (a change in subject-position) makes sense.   
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